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First-personFolk Psychology: Mindshaping and
Mindreading
Leon de Bruin
Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen
Proponents of mindshaping argue that third-person folk psychology (i.e., the as-
cription of mental states to others) is not primarily about “reading” mental states
for the purpose of behavior prediction and explanation. Instead, they claim that
third-person folk psychology is rst and foremost a regulative practice—one that
“shapes” mental states in accordance with the norms of a shared folk psychologi-
cal framework.is paper investigates to what extent the core assumptions behind
the mindshaping hypothesis are compatible with an account of rst-person folk
psychology (i.e., the ascription of mental states to ourselves) that is based on the
notion of “self-regulative agency.”
Keywords: McGeer, Moran, rst-person folk psychology, mindshaping, mindread-
ing
1. Introduction
e philosophical debate on folk psychology has primarily focused on the
question of how we understand other people. Proponents of mindreading
typicallymaintain that understanding others depends on a capacity to “read”
and represent theirmental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, etc.),
which allows us to predict and explain their behavior. Some of them argue
that this requires a theory about how mental states are related to perceptual
input, actions and other mental states. Others claim that it involves “putting
ourselves in the shoes of others” by simulating the mental states we would
have in their situation.
ese explanations, respectively theeoryeory and the Simulation
eory, have been heavily criticized over the last couple of decades. Accord-
ing to proponents ofmindshaping (e.g., McGeer 2007; Hutto 2008; Andrews
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2008; Zawidzki 2013), understanding others does not depend on some inter-
nal capacity to read and represent mental states for the purpose of behavior
prediction and explanation. Instead, they argue that folk psychology is rst
and foremost a regulative practice—one that “shapes” the mental states of
others in accordance with the norms of a shared folk psychological frame-
work.
emain aimof the present paper is to investigate towhat extent the core
assumptions behind thismindshaping account of third-person folk psychol-
ogy (i.e., the ascription of mental states to others) are compatible with an
account of rst-person folk psychology (i.e., the ascription of mental states
to ourselves) that is based on the notion of “self-regulative agency.”
e paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I start with an introduc-
tion of the core assumptions behind the mindshaping hypothesis, and show
how they dier from those that fuel theories of mindreading. In section 3,
I discuss two accounts of rst-person folk psychology, developed by Peter
Carruthers and Richard Moran. Carruthers argues that self-ascribing men-
tal states is a matter of “turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves.”
On his view, there is no principled dierence between how we understand
others and how we understand ourselves. Moran, by contrast, argues that
there is a crucial dierence: understanding ourselves is fundamentally agen-
tive and depends on a capacity to “make up our minds.” Moran’s account is
promising but also limited—it focuses exclusively on a conscious capacity
for rational agency and dismisses the importance of taking an “objective,”
third-person stance towards oneself. In section 4, I propose a richer view of
rst-person folk psychology which is based on Victoria McGeer’s notion of
“self-regulative agency.” On this view, rst-person folk psychology should be
seen as a self-regulative practice by which we bring our mental and bodily
states into alignment according to the norms and expectations of our social
environment. Section 5 discusses some further dierences between Moran
andMcGeer in order to explore to what extent the concept of self-regulative
agency is compatible with the core assumptions behind mindshaping (as
presented in Section 2). Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the
importance of self-regulative agency for the special authoritative status of
self-ascriptions.
2. What is mindshaping?
e best way to explain the concept of mindshaping is to show how it diers
from the concept ofmindreading. In this section I will therefore concentrate
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on what I take to be some of the main disagreements between proponents
of mindshaping and proponents of mindreading.1
First, proponents of mindshaping and proponents of mindreading dis-
agree about the primary function of third-person folk psychology. Accord-
ing to proponents of mindreading, folk psychology should be dened as the
ability to read and represent the mental states of others (most importantly
their beliefs and desires) in order to predict or explain their behavior. Pro-
ponents of mindshaping, by contrast, claim that folk psychology is essen-
tially a regulative practice that shapes the way in which we act, think and
operate. ey argue that we are able to understand others because we both
participate in a folk psychological framework of shared cultural norms and
expectations, and because we have learned to present ourselves in ways that
t this framework.
Second, proponents of mindshaping point out that understanding oth-
ers is not a “spectator sport” of inferring mental states from a distance. Folk
psychology is exercised in second-person, interactive contexts rather than
third-person observational settings.is is also howwe acquire our folk psy-
chological skills, namely, in conditions ofmutual engagement and by playing
the game of giving and asking for reasons.
ird, proponents of mindshaping propose a shi of focus in the expla-
nation of third-person folk psychology, from internal (individual) capacities
to external (social) structures and practices. is is oen accompanied by
arguments from parsimony, in the sense that mindshaping is said to be cog-
nitively less demanding. McGeer (2007), for example, claims:
When we develop as folk psychologists, we no doubt hone our in-
terpretative skills; but, more importantly, we come to live in a world
where the kind of interpretive work we need to do is enormously en-
hanced by how much meaning our interactions already carry for us
and carry because of the way we habitually conform to norms that
invest our actions with common meaning. (McGeer 2007, 150)
In other words, the idea is that mindshaping to some extent obviates the
need for mindreading. If we are able to make sense of the actions of others
from the perspective of a folk psychological framework of shared cultural
norms, we do not need to read and represent their mental states.
Of course, proponents of mindshaping do recognize that the exercise
and acquisition of folk psychological skills also depends on individual cog-
nitive capacities. However, they typically argue that understanding others
requires more than considering their beliefs and desires. We also engage
1 For amore critical evaluation ofmindreading accounts and the concept of folk psychology,
see (Zawidzki 2008) and (Ratclie 2005; Ratclie 2007) respectively.
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with others’ emotions, goals, moods and character traits, and interact with
them on the basis of the social roles they play and the histories they have ex-
perienced (Andrews 2015). Proponents of mindshaping tend to explain this
in terms of shared linguistic practices rather than individual cognitive capac-
ities in order to emphasize that the latter are shaped by the former (which is
the main point of mindshaping). Hutto (2008), for example, proposes that
folk psychology develops through participation in “narrative practice”—a
shared activity of telling and listening to the stories behind people’s actions.
His hypothesis is that through attentive listening and active participation
(e.g., asking questions), children gain familiarity with the way beliefs, de-
sires and other folk psychological concepts interrelate and lead to action.
e emphasis on narrative practice dovetails nicely with the claim about
the primary function of folk psychology. According to proponents of mind-
shaping, folk psychological narratives can help us to understand others in
cases where their actions deviate from the expectations and norms of our
shared practice, by revealing the reasons on which they acted. Folk psycho-
logical narratives can serve an explanatory function by contextualizing and
normalizing behavior that is “out of line,” forging “links between the excep-
tional and the ordinary” (Bruner 1990, 47).
Although proponents of mindshaping agree with proponents of embod-
ied cognition that folk psychology depends on more basic embodied prac-
tices (see, e.g., Gallagher 2001; Gallagher 2012), they insist that folk psychol-
ogy plays a crucial role in understanding others.eir aim is not to eliminate
or trivialize the importance of folk psychology. On the contrary, they want
to give a re-description of the explanandum, i.e., what it is that we should try
to explain. At the same time, however, this re-description of folk psychology
usually goes hand in hand with a renewed respect for more embodied forms
of understanding others.
To sumup, then, the dierences betweenmindshaping andmindreading
can be roughly described as follows:
1. e main function of folk psychology is not prediction or explana-
tion, but the regulation of behavior (in a broad sense).
2. Folk psychology is not about reading minds from an observational,
third-person point of view; it is about shaping them in second-
person interactive contexts.
3. Folk psychology depends on (external) shared linguistic structures
and practices, rather than (internal) individual cognitive capacities.
174 First-person Folk Psychology: Mindshaping andMindreading
3. Understanding others and understanding ourselves
Views of rst-person folk psychology are oen based on the assumption that
there is an important dierence between our understanding of others and
our understanding of self. According to one inuential theory, the dierence
is that we can directly introspect our own mental states, whereas we have to
infer the mental states of others.is gives us “privileged access”—a special
kind of epistemic authority with respect to self-ascriptions of mental states.
Some philosophers argue that the introspective access to our own men-
tal states is both prior and serves as a foundation for the attribution ofmental
states to others. Goldman (1993; 2006), for example, defends a version of the
Simulationeory which involves the following elements: a) an analogical
inference from oneself to others, b) premised on introspectively based as-
criptions of mental states to oneself, and c) requiring prior possession of the
concepts of the mental states ascribed.
Other philosophers, by contrast, propose that self-understanding pre-
supposes a capacity to understand others. Carruthers (2009; 2011), for ex-
ample, claims that we have a single “mindreading mechanism” that allows
us to infer and attribute mental states to self and others solely on the basis
of sensory input. In cases of third-person folk psychology, the sensory input
will typically be restricted to perceptual (behavioral, situational) input. In
cases of rst-person folk psychology, the system also has internal sensory
information at its disposal, including proprioception, interoception, visual
and other kinds of imagery. Yet, the kind of access we have to our ownmen-
tal states is no dierent in principle from our access to the mental states of
others.
On Carruthers’ account, then, the dierence between rst-person and
third-person ways of knowing minds is merely a matter of degree.e spe-
cial authority we grant people with respect to their own mental states turns
out to be a mere quantitative epistemic advantage. Both ways of knowing
should be understood in terms of the amount and kind of information that
one’s mindreading mechanism can get its hands on. Surely the dierence
will normally be signicant, since the information provided by rst-person
imagination, inner speech, and somato-sensory input is bound to be richer
than the information obtained through perception of someone else’s situ-
ated behavior. Yet, ultimately, we understand ourselves in the same way as
we understand others.
An alternative view of rst-person folk psychology has been put forward
by Richard Moran (2001). On the one hand, Moran agrees with Carruthers
that the special status of self-ascriptions cannot be secured on the basis of
some kind of introspective process that gives us privileged access to our own
mental states. On the other hand, however, Moran argues that this does
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not mean that there is no qualitative dierence between how we understand
ourselves and how we understand others. On Moran’s account, what makes
this dierence is a rst-person capacity for rational agency. is capacity
allows us to “make up our mind,” i.e., to determine our beliefs and other
mental states by means of rational deliberation.
ere are interesting parallels between Moran’s account of self-under-
standing andmindshaping accounts of howwe understand others. Like pro-
ponents ofmindshaping,Moran construes understanding as an activity, and
argues that it does not result from passively observing mental states. Mind-
reading accounts such as the one proposed by Carruthers fail to recognize
the importance of (conscious) rational agency, and present us with “an es-
sentially supercial view of the dierences between my relation to myself
and my possible relation to others” (Moran 2001, 91).
Carruthers claims that empirical studies on confabulation show that we
do not always judge best which states and processes are psychologically ac-
tive in us and have a causal impact on our behavior. But Moran argues that
this sort of epistemic accuracy is not really to the point when it comes to the
special status of self-ascriptions:
[T]he primary thought gaining expression in the idea of ‘rst-person
authority’ may not be that the person himself must always ‘know best’
what he thinks about something, but rather that it is his businesswhat
he thinks about something, that it is up to him. In declaring his belief,
he does not express himself as an expert witness to a realm of psycho-
logical fact, so much as he expresses his rational authority over that
realm. (Moran 2001, 123–124)
According to Moran, our capacity for rational agency allows us to play
an active role in the determination of ourmental states by deliberating about
the reasons for having them. When people ask us what we believe, we do not
track internal mental states, as we might perceptually track external objects
and events in the world. Rather, we rst reect on what, given the current
state of theworld, our beliefs ought to be; and then, insofar aswe are rational,
we actively endorse their content by avowing them.2 is is how we are able
to shape our minds and express rational authority over our mental states.
2 An avowal, asMoran uses the term, is a declaration of one’s belief which obeys the so-called
“Transparency Condition”: “With respect to belief, the claim of transparency is that from
within the rst-person perspective, I treat the question of my belief about P as equivalent
to the question of the truth of P” (Moran 2001, 62–63). us, when asked whether we
believe that P, we need to reect on the reasons we have for believing that P. As soon as
we reconsider and start doubting P’s truth, the avowal ceases to exist (Moran 2001, 74–77,
80–82; see also Kloosterboer 2015).
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4. Rational or self-regulative agency?
Sometimes our avowals are in conict with our actions. Consider the follow-
ing example. You have decided to stop smoking cigarettes. Aer a couple of
months, however, it turns out that your smoking habits are stronger than you
thought. Your rst response is to reconsider your decision to stop smoking
altogether. Is it so bad to smoke the occasional cigarette? You go through the
same deliberative process over and over again, but as it turns out, the con-
clusion remains the same. Yes, it is indeed rational to stop smoking. At this
point your partner intervenes and gives you the following advice: although
there is nothing wrong with your sincere avowals to stop smoking, what you
really need to focus on are those factors that unconsciously inuence your
smoking behavior (e.g., being in the company of other smokers, being un-
der a lot of stress, etc.) She suggests that you should take concrete steps to
diminish the inuence of these factors (e.g., by instructing your friends and
family not to give you cigarettes).
According toMoran, this would actually be a piece of bad advice insofar
as trying tomanipulate your behavior in this way involves the kind of control
that is “not the expression of ‘activity’ relevant to autonomy or rational au-
thority” (Moran 2001, 117). By adopting an instrumental, third-person per-
spective on yourself, you cease to function as a rational being because you
answer questions about your mental states merely in the attributive sense.
at is, you are only interested in whether you have these mental states or
not, regardless of the reasons for or against them. You become “alienated”
from yourself because you answer questions about your own mental states
as if you were answering questions about the mental states of another agent.
Elsewhere I have argued (De Bruin et al. 2015; De Bruin and Strijbos
2015) that Moran’s rejection of the third-person perspective is misguided,
and that McGeer’s (1996; 2007) ideas about “self-regulative agency” provide
us with the basics of a more promising account of rst-person folk-psy-
chology. In contrast to the pure form of deliberative agency advocated by
Moran, self-regulative agency concerns the question of “how best to bring
about causally what ought to arise spontaneously as the expressive outcome
of deliberation itself ” (McGeer 2008, 91). Besides trying to be a better de-
liberative agent, this also involves engaging in extra-deliberative activities,
such as making notes to yourself, asking your partner for advice, or chang-
ing your (social) environment. Self-regulative agency implies that you are
able to step back from your rst-personal avowals, in order to reect on
them from the third-person perspective. is allows you to make a more
balanced and comprehensive assessment of the relevant factors that shape
and structure your reasoning, and your capacity to stay true to your com-
mitments. It also implies keeping an eye on the deliberative processes that
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motivate your avowals, since we oen lure ourselves into believing or want-
ing something despite deep convictions, desires or feelings to the contrary.
As McGeer puts it:
[O]ur best protection—indeed, our only protection—against an ego-
driven corruption of reason is to cultivate an allocentric capacity to
see ourselves as we see others—namely, as empirical subjects whose
psychological states are responding to a variety of inuences that are
largely invisible from a naïvely egocentric rst-person point of view.
(McGeer 2008, 101)
Although avowals still play an important role in McGeer’s account, they
are part of a larger attempt at self-regulation. Your decision to stay inside
when your friends are going out for a smoke may take the form of delibera-
tive avowal (‘I really believe I should stay inside’), but such a decision is not
just a transparent conclusion about what you believe. It involves a commit-
ment to regulate your mental states in such a way as to make sure that you
will refrain from lighting a cigarette.
5. First-person folk psychology: Mindshaping andmindreading
Although McGeer is oen seen as a proponent of the mindshaping hypoth-
esis, the concept of self-regulative agency includes elements of mindreading
as well, and therefore warrants further investigation. In this section, I will
discuss some further dierences betweenMoran andMcGeer in order to ex-
plore to what extent the concept of self-regulative agency is compatible with
the ideas about mindshaping as discussed in Section 2. Roughly, these dif-
ferences come down to questions about the “how,” the “what” and the “why”
of mindshaping.
Both Moran and proponents of mindshaping construe folk psychology
as an activity, and argue against accounts that attempt to explain it in terms
of passively reading and representing mental states. However, Moran’s no-
tion of mindshaping is restricted to what can be deliberatively avowed from
the rst-person perspective. us, on Moran’s account, the “why” question
of how mindshaping works is answered by appealing to an individual ca-
pacity for rational agency. You make up your mind by deliberating about
the reasons for and against your mental states (which is what makes it ratio-
nal), and this is something only you can do (which is what makes it strictly
individual). In this respect, Moran’s position seems closer to proponents of
mindreading, who are also primarily interested in individual cognitive ca-
pacities.
McGeer’s account, on the other hand, suggests a much richer notion of
mindshaping. Although it recognizes the importance of the rst-person per-
spective, self-regulative agency also assigns a crucial role to the third-person
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perspective. is, of course, is incompatible with the assumption that folk
psychology is not about reading and representing mental states from an ob-
servational point of view, which most proponents of mindshaping seem to
take for granted (see Section 2). But how valid is this assumption? Usually
we understand others in a variety of ways, and although some of them are in-
deed highly interactive, we also and not infrequently simply observe other
people and try to gure out what they are thinking about (Overgaard and
Michael 2015; De Bruin et al. 2012). Ultimately, our preference for one type
of stance might simply be a question of psychological prole (e.g., “extro-
vert” people tend to interact, whereas “introvert” people tend to observe).
In a similar manner, one could argue that it is simply an empirical ques-
tion whether people tend to take the rst- or third-person stance towards
themselves. An account of rst-person folk psychology that is grounded in
self-regulative agency does not need to prescribe the exact balance between
the two stances that should be struck. Normatively speaking, the only rele-
vant question is how to avoid the extreme ends of the spectrum. On the one
hand, an agent who persistently adopts the third-person perspective on his
own mental states undermines his deliberative power and his capacity to be
rationally autonomous. On the other hand, an agent who is unable to take
this stance can manipulate himself into a condition of deep self-deception.
At this point, the terminology has become quite complicated, so it might
be good to clarify how I understand the terms ‘rst-person’ and ‘third-person’
in the account of folk psychology I am discussing here. At the start of this
paper, I coined the term ‘rst-person folk psychology’ to designate the as-
cription of mental states to ourselves—in contrast to ‘third-person folk psy-
chology’, which refers to the ascription of mental states to others. If we un-
derstand rst-person folk psychology in terms of self-regulation, however,
then the ascription of mental states to ourselves is only one side of the coin
(i.e., the “mindreading” side). e other side consists of a capacity for ra-
tional agency, which allows us to deliberate about our mental states and our
reasons for having them. What might be slightly confusing is that, following
Moran and McGeer, I have also used the distinction between ‘rst-person’
and ‘third-person’ to characterize the two stances we can take towards our-
selves.
Irrespective of the labels we use to characterize these stances, however,
it is important to recognize that self-regulation is verymuch a second-person
activity. OnMoran’s account, making up your mind is your own business; it
is something only you can do. Self-regulative agency, by contrast, is situated
in a broader context of interactions with others. As the smoking example in
the previous section showed, these others do not only challenge our avowals
and the mental states we ascribe to ourselves, and thereby our rst-person
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authority, but they are also (in the most literal sense) part of the processes
that structure and shape ourmental and bodily states. Self-regulative agency,
although it recruits individual capacities, is best characterized as a second-
person practice.
is brings me to the “target” of mindshaping, or the “what” question.
Moran’s account focuses on propositional attitudes that we are conscious of,
although there are reasons to doubt whether it works for other propositional
attitudes than belief (see, for example, De Bruin et al. 2015; Kloosterboer
2015).
On McGeer’s account, the target of mindshaping has a much broader
scope. First of all, self-regulative agency is not restricted to beliefs or other
propositional attitudes we are conscious of. On the contrary, many self-
regulative activities are part of our habits or routines (e.g., not going to bed
too late, having a decent breakfast, turning o the music when starting to
work, etc.). ey are performed more or less automatically and with very
little conscious reection. Of course, some of these activities are more ef-
fortful and do require careful deliberation and reection. For example, we
might reect on whether we should abandon some of our longstanding be-
liefs, and we might take steps so that we are more likely to abandon them.
Wemight also pay special attention to our belief-forming habits, and closely
monitor the way in which we reach certain beliefs, checking our habits of
inference and guarding against malfunction (Pettit and McGeer 2002, 289;
McGeer 2008, 89). is is usually a complex and dynamic process that in-
volves going back and forth between the two stances we can take towards
ourselves. Again, the exact balance or frequency is not what matters here.
Nor is the point that we have to engage in all these types of self-regulation all
the time. What is important is that we have the capacity to do so when the
need arises, and this is usually determined by our interactions with others.
Second, self-regulative agency is not restricted to mental states—it tar-
gets bodily states as well. Indeed, it is by regulating our bodily states that we
try to bridge the gap between saying and doing, i.e., between our avowals
and our actions. Suppose you are involved in a long-term relationship, but
somehow manage to work seven days a week. At some point, your part-
ner confronts you about your long working hours and asks you whether you
truly want to be part of a meaningful relationship. In response, you avow
that this is indeed what you want, and you promise her to put your money
where your mouth is, i.e., you promise her to work less and spend more
time together. If successful, this would be a case of “upward” self-regulation,
where you align your actions with your avowals.
Of course, it is also possible that, aer several failed attempts to get your
priorities straight, you have to conclude that you cannot keep your word.
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Perhaps you have a very demanding job, or you really need the money. Per-
haps you are simply not “relationship material.” In such a case of “down-
ward” self-regulation, you bridge the gap between saying anddoing by chang-
ing your mind instead of your bodily states. Your habits and tendencies turn
out to be stronger than expected, and you no longer avow that you want to
be part of this relationship.
When it comes to questions about the “how” and “what” of mindshap-
ing, McGeer seems to go beyond Moran insofar as self-regulative agency
oers a richer notion of mindshaping and a broader scope of its target than
rational agency.e fact that self-regulative agency is not restricted to con-
scious propositional attitudes, but also targets unconscious, bodily states ts
very well with the ideas about mindshaping as discussed in Section 2. is
is also true for the characterization of self-regulative agency as a second-
person practice. Despite the fact that most proponents of mindshaping tend
to downplay the importance of the third-person perspective, I tend to see the
dynamic interplay between the rst- and the third-person perspective that is
implied by self-regulative agency as one of its most attractive features: it not
only oers a promising way to explain how we are able to overcome the gap
between saying and doing (see above), but also makes it possible to secure
the special authoritative status of self-ascriptions (see below).
But what about the “why” ofmindshaping? OnMoran’s account, making
up your mind involves focusing exclusively on the contents of your mental
states and the reasons you have for or against them.e aim of rst-person
deliberation is to answer the question: “What shall I—qua agent—believe?”
Self-regulative agency, by contrast, is primarily a way to facilitate increas-
ingly complex forms of social coordination and cooperation. is is very
much in line with the assumption that folk psychology primarily has a so-
cial function, which most proponents of mindshaping accept.
Here I think that the answers oered by Moran and McGeer are both
valuable in their own right. It is true that we sometimes have to question
the deliberative processes that motivate our avowals (e.g., in cases of self-
deception). But it is also true that we sometimes need to be critical of the
norms and expectations of our social environment (e.g., when social reform
is needed). According to Andrews (2015), understanding ourselves should
primarily be seen as a dictate towards empathy: “To know oneself one needs
to know how one is perceived by others, to take on the other’s perspective
and see oneself reected back through her eyes” (Andrews 2015, 294). How-
ever, it seems to me that understanding oneself also has another dimension,
one that is perhaps best captured by Kant in the opening lines of “What is
Enlightenment?”, where he states:
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Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage.
Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without an-
other’s guidance. is nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in
lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use
one’s own mind without another’s guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere
aude.) “Have the courage to use your own understanding,” is there-
fore the motto of the enlightenment. (Kant 1973, 384)
Taking this motto seriously implies that avowals can stand on their own—
they are not merely part of a larger attempt at self-regulation (contrary to
what McGeer suggests, see the end of Section 4).
6. Self-regulative agency and rst-person authority
All of this suggests a natural answer to the question of rst-person authority.
On the view presented here, the authoritative status of our self-ascriptions
depends on a practice of self-regulative agency. In everyday life we assume
that people are able to keep their word and shape their behavior in accor-
dance with the mental states they attribute to themselves. is shows that
rst-person authority is not only about “making up your mind”; it also in-
volves “shaping your body.” Together with the capacity for rational agency,
this capacity to control and manipulate our behavior is what marks the dif-
ference between self-understanding and understanding others. us, we
are granted rst-person authority insofar as we are able to bridge the gap
between saying and doing by aligning our actions with our avowals. First-
person authority is withheld when we fail to live up to our avowals; in such
cases, others expect us to “change our mind” instead and shape our mental
states in accordance with the behavior we display.
is does not mean that rst-person authority can be reduced to a form
of self-regulation in the service of others. On the contrary, because others are
constitutive of the processes that structure and shape our mental and bodily
states, rst-person authority as self-regulative agency oen implies forms of
“other-regulation” as well. Making up your mind creates a standard that you
try to live up to, but this is frequently one that you hope others will live up
to as well. By changing ourselves, we also change (our interactions with) the
people around us, and this in turn has an impact on howwe understand our-
selves. ese “looping eects” (Andrews 2015) are possible because we are
able to adopt both the rst- and the third-person perspective on ourselves.
Of course, more needs to be said about the specic sort of situations in
which rst-person is granted or withheld, and the kind of capacities that are
required on behalf of the self-regulating agent. at, however, is something
for another paper.
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